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Abstract 
The paper analyses the economic payoffs from marine reserves using a stochastic 
optimal control model. The results show that even if the reserve and harvested 
populations face the same negative shocks, harvesting is optimal, the population is 
persistent and with no uncertainty over current stock size, a reserve can increase 
resource rents. Using actual fishery data we demonstrate that the payoffs from a 
reserve, and also optimum reserve size, increase the larger is the magnitude of the 
negative shock, the greater its frequency, and the larger its relative impact on the 
harvested population. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper analyses the economic payoffs from marine reserves using a stochastic optimal control 
model. The results show that even if the reserve and harvested populations face the same negative 
shocks, harvesting is optimal, the population is persistent and with no uncertainty over current 
stock size, a reserve can increase resource rents. Using actual fishery data we demonstrate that 
the payoffs from a reserve, and also optimum reserve size, increase the larger is the magnitude of 
the negative shock, the greater its frequency, and the larger its relative impact on the harvested 
population.  
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I Introduction 
 
A decade ago there were over 1300 marine reserves worldwide, but many more reserves are 
planned (Botsford et al. 1997).1 Under some proposals, marine protected areas could increase 
from less than 1% of the earth’s oceans (Boersma and Parrish, 1999), to upwards of 20% or more 
of marine coastal areas (Agardy et al., 2003).2 If this commitment is achieved, it will represent 
the largest ever transformation in the use (or rather non-use) of the earth’s surface. 
Despite the increasing adoption of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, and the 
commitment in some countries, such as Australia, to establish a National Representative System 
of Marine Protected Areas, the economic benefits of reserves for fishers remain uncertain. 
Indeed, many fishers oppose the establishment of reserves (National Research Council, 2001) and 
claim reserves would be redundant if existing management tools (gear restrictions, effort and 
output controls, etc.) were properly implemented. In this paper we investigate the economic 
payoffs of reserves to fishers in a stochastic environment that includes two forms of uncertainty 
(a continuous diffusion process and a jump process), and with harvesting that maximises the 
discounted net returns from fishing, taking into account both the size and probability of the 
stochastic processes.  
Our approach allows us to analyse the benefits of reserves to fishers with environmental 
uncertainty, separate from any payoffs that may arise from management uncertainty over the 
stock size or fishing effort, sub-optimal harvesting, or whether the population is subject to 
extinction. Our original results indicate that spillovers, or transfers of fish from the reserve to 
harvested population, allow for a larger harvest and can increase resource rents following a shock 
that lowers the population, even if harvesting is optimal. These spillovers also create a resilience 
effect that allows the harvested population to recover faster from a negative shock.3 We show that 
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the economic payoff from a reserve, and its optimum size, are increasing the larger is the size of 
the negative shock, the more frequent its incidence, and the larger its proportional impact on the 
harvested relative to the reserve population.  
In the following section we briefly review the literature on marine reserves. We then outline 
in Section III the bioeconomic model and perturbation method we use to determine the economic 
payoffs associated with a reserve. In Section IV we simulate the economic effects of a marine 
reserve using parameters estimated from an actual fishery under a range of scenarios, and also 
analyse the effects of biological and economic variables on the payoffs from a reserve. 
Concluding remarks are offered in Section V. 
 
II The Bioeconomics of Marine Reserves 
 
A huge literature exists in terms of marine reserves, mostly written from a biological 
perspective.4 A key insight is that how many, and under what conditions, fish migrate or spillover 
from reserves to harvested areas is critical to maximising the direct benefits of ‘no take’ areas 
(Polachek, 1990). These spillovers occur whenever individual fish are afforded a measure of 
protection in a reserve, but also provide a source of recruitment for exploited areas outside of the 
reserve (Pulliam, 1988).  
Roberts et al. (2001) and McClanahan and Mangi (2000), among others, provide empirical 
evidence that reserves can generate positive spillovers that may improve harvests in adjacent 
exploited areas. Pezzey et al. (2000) and Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) have shown in theoretical 
models, with density-dependent growth, that a reserve can increase the abundance of the 
population and, in some cases, may even raise the aggregate harvest in the exploited population. 
However, this ‘double payoff’ only arises when the chosen area for the reserve is at a low 
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population level such that the marginal benefits of a closure — reduced mortality, but with 
spillovers — outweigh the loss of harvest in a previously exploited area. 
 
(i) Deterministic Bioeconomic Models 
One of the earliest economic contributions to the reserve literature is by Holland and Brazee 
(1996) who use a deterministic model to show that the relative benefits of reserves depend on  
their effects on harvesting in exploited areas and also the discount rate. They find that with very 
high levels of fishing effort that a reserve provides insurance against a collapse in the population, 
but emphasise that reserves give little or no benefit if there exist effective controls on effort or 
catches.  Hannesson (1998) obtains a similar result. He shows that a reserve is redundant if the 
total catch can be perfectly controlled, and that a reserve would need to be of a very large size to 
generate harvesting benefits associated with an optimally controlled fishery. By contrast, Neubert 
(2003) uses a spatially explicit model to show that reserves can increase yields, but this result 
critically depends on boundary conditions that assume fish live in patches of suitable habitat, 
beyond which they die. 
Holland (2000) observes in a spatially explicit model that optimal controls on effort and 
catches make reserves superfluous, but stresses there can be a positive economic payoff to a 
reserve if fishing effort is excessive. Sanchirico (2004) also finds in a spatial model that a first-
best strategy is to optimally set fishing effort in every possible fishing location, but that 
establishing reserves in some patches can generate a higher resource rent in an open access 
fishery. He emphasises, as do Sanchirico and Wilen (1999), that the costs and returns of 
harvesting in different locations, as well as the spillovers, play an important role in determining 
where to establish reserves.  
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(ii) Stochastic Models 
Lauck et al. (1998) show that given management uncertainty over population size, marine 
reserves should increase with the size of the negative shocks to ensure population persistence. 
Mangel (1998, 2000a) generates a similar result whereby reserve size should increase with the 
size of an uncertain harvest rate so as to ensure sustainability of the population. Li (2000) finds 
that if the probability of total stock collapse decreases with the size of a marine reserve, a reserve 
has an economic value. Sumaila (1998) also shows that reserves mitigate against biological losses 
that may arise due to recruitment failure. In a bioeconomic model, Conrad (1999) shows that 
reserves may generate economic benefits by reducing the variance of the population if net growth 
in the reserve and the fishery are uncorrelated, or if they are perfectly correlated. In addition, 
Sladek Nowlis and Roberts (1998), Mangel (2000b) and Hannesson (2002) demonstrate that with 
environmental variability a reserve can lower the harvesting variance. 
Those who incorporate stochasticity into their models show that reserves have value because 
either they mitigate the effects of environmental surprises and help ensure population persistence 
given management error (inability to control harvests) or management uncertainty (imprecise 
information on current population), or because they reduce the variance of populations and 
harvests. Many fishers and some fishery managers have used these findings to conclude that if 
harvesting is ‘optimal’, and the population is persistent, marine reserves generate no harvesting 
payoffs to fishers and are a redundant management tool. Using a stochastic bioeconomic model, 
we examine whether fishers can, in fact, benefit from a marine reserve under conditions where 
‘no take’ areas are, at best, viewed as superfluous or even harmful to fisher incomes. 
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III A Stochastic Bioeconomic of a Marine Reserve 
 
To address the question of what is the economic payoff of a reserve to fishers we explicitly model 
environmental uncertainty. We assume that the population, without harvesting, is governed by 
density-dependent growth defined by  
 
 ( ) (1 )xf x rx
K
= −  (1) 
 
where x  is the population or biomass, ( )f x  is its growth, r is the intrinsic growth rate, and K is 
the carrying capacity.  
The model assumes the economic benefit from the population is simply the resource rents it 
generates, and thus ignores the value of reserves in terms of biodiversity (Hastings and Botsford, 
2003). This assumption allows us to determine if a reserve is worthwhile only in terms of the 
economic payoffs it provides to fishers, separate from any benefits associated with population 
persistence, management error, management uncertainty over stock size, or the existence of 
ecological (Roberts et al., 2003) and non-market (Bhat, 2003) values. 
Inter-temporal rents from harvesting the population are defined by  
 ( , ) ( ) ( , )NRNR
NR
xh x p h h c h
K
Π = −  (2) 
where h is harvest, NRx  is the size of the harvested population,  is the carrying capacity of the 
harvested population,
NRK
( )p h  is the inverse demand function, and ( , )NR
NR
xc h
K
 is the aggregate cost 
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function where costs rise with the harvest, but do not increase with population density of the 
harvested population. 
In the case of a permanent reserve that protects proportion (0,1]s∈  of the population, the 
carrying capacity of the harvested population is defined by (1 )s K− . Thus for s > 0 the growth 
function of the reserve population, ( , )Rf x s , and the harvested population, ( , )NRf x s , are  
 ( , ) (1 )RR R
xf x s rx
sK
= −  (3) 
 ( , ) (1 )
(1 )
NR
NR NR
xs rx
s K−f x = −  (4) 
where Rx  and NRx  are the reserve and harvested populations.
5 In our model we assume r and K 
are the same for both the reserve and harvested populations, but they may differ — especially in 
the case of a long-established reserve.6   
To analyse the effects of reserves on resource rents, we incorporate two stochastic shocks that 
may affect both the reserve and harvested populations. One shock may be either a positive or 
negative and represents a temporal variation in both populations, as defined by a Wiener 
diffusion process (Brownian motion) that follows a normal distribution ( ). The other stochastic 
process is a negative shock that occurs randomly over time and is defined as a jump process ( q ) 
that follows a Poisson distribution, governed by the parameter 
tW
λ .  
Brownian motion in the reserve and harvested population is defined by  and  
that represent the proportional effect on the two populations from the same realization,  
Sensitivity to negative shocks in the reserve and harvested population is defined by 
( )Rg x ( )NRg x
.dW
( )Rxψ  and 
( NR )xγ  that represent the proportional effects on the populations from the same realization, dq . 
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The functions ψ  and γ  differ to allow for the possibility that the sensitivity to the negative 
shocks may vary in the reserve and harvested populations.  
To solve for the optimal harvest trajectory and reserve size we must first determine the 
optimal harvest for a given reserve size, and then select the reserve size that maximises the 
overall value function defined over (0,1]s∈ . Thus the solution to the overall optimisation 
problem is defined over all possible values of s and involves the selection of both a harvesting 
trajectory and a reserve size that maximise the discounted net returns from fishing.  
The initial harvest optimisation problem, incorporating the two stochastic processes and for 
an arbitrary s, is defined by equations (5) to (8), 
  (5) 
0
( , ) max ( , , )tR NR h NRV x x e h x s
ρ∞ −= Π∫
subject to: 
 
 [ ( , ) (1 ) ( )] ( ) ( )
(1 )
NRR
R R R R
xxdx f x s s K dt g x dW x dq
sK s K
φ ψ= − − − + +−  (6) 
 [ ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ] ( ) ( )
(1 )
NRR
NR NR NR NR
xxdx f x s s K h dt g x dW x dq
sK s K
φ γ= + − − − + +−  (7) 
 0 (0)x x=  (8) 
where is the value function, ( , )R NRV x x 0x  is the sum of the initial population in and outside of 
the reserve, ρ  is the discount rate and φ  is the transfer coefficient. The transfer function, 
(1 ) ( )
(1 )
NRR xxs K
sK s K
φ − − − , is compatible with diffusion models in fisheries that suggest reserve 
size directly influences dispersal (Kramer and Chapman, 1999)7, and is also consistent with 
evidence  that dispersion is strongly density dependent (MacCall, 1990).8  Our specification 
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ensures the transfer of fish is governed by both reserve size and the relative population density of 
the reserve and harvested populations, but also allows for the possibility of transfers into the 
reserve if the population density is greater outside of the reserve.  
Using Ito’s Lemma, Bellman’s fundamental equation of optimality can be used to solve for 
the harvest trajectory for any given reserve size, i.e., 
 
2 2
( , , ) ( )[ ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ]
(1 )
( )[ ( , ) (1 ) ( )]
( , ) max (1 )
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
[ ( ( ), ( )) ( )]
NR
R
R R NR NR R NR
NRR
NR x NR
NRR
x R
R NR h
x x R x x NR x x R NR
R R NR NR
xxh x s V x f x s s K h
sK s K
xxV x f x s s K
V x x sK s K
V g x V g x V g x g x
V x x x x V x
φ
φρ
λ ψ γ
Π + + − − −−
+ − − − += −
+ + +
+ + −
 (9) 
 
Given the complexity of the stochastic jump-diffusion process, it is not possible to find a solution 
to (9) analytically, but it can be solved numerically with a modified form of the perturbation 
method introduced by Gaspar and Judd (1997) and Judd (1997).9 The method involves 
introducing two auxiliary variables (one for a Brownian diffusion process and another for the 
jump process) defined as η  and ε  to the Bellman equation, where if 0η ε= =  the deterministic 
problem results. Following the substitution, for a given , the decision function and value 
function can be defined as 
s
( , , , )NRh x η εΠ and ( , , , )NR RV x x η ε , and a nth order Taylor series 
expansion can be defined around the steady state in the deterministic case.  
In the first step to solving (9), we find the steady state in the deterministic case ( 0η ε= = ) by 
using the maximum condition for the Bellman equation, applying the Envelope Theorem and the 
equations of motion for the reserve and non-reserve populations. In the second step, we 
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differentiate the maximum condition and Envelope theorem equation with respect to the state 
variables Rx  and NRx . In step three, we differentiate the Bellman equation to find Vη  and Vε  that 
are expressions of higher order derivatives with respect to the state variables found in step two. 
Successive differentiation of the Bellman equation with respect to the auxiliary variables, control 
variables and state variables allows us to solve with greater precision for required values in a 
grid-like pattern.  
We automated the solution process for all possible values of s by using MAPLE to calculate 
the partial derivatives of the optimal value function and control variables with respect to the state 
and the auxiliary variables. This allows us to solve for the optimal harvest levels for any given 
reserve size. The optimal reserve size ( s∗ ) is that which gives the highest economic value for all 
possible reserve sizes and maximises the overall value function, , that is an envelope 
of value functions for all possible values of s for the two stochastic realisations ( and ). 
( , )R NRV x x
∗
dq dW
 
IV The Economic Payoffs from Marine Reserves 
 
The economic payoffs to fishers from a reserve will depend on many bioeconomic factors 
including the discount rate, intrinsic growth rate, carrying capacity, transfer function and the 
magnitude and incidence of shocks. Our perturbation method, however, provides an approach to 
assess the economic benefits from reserves by varying any, or all, of these parameters.  
To illustrate the economic effects of reserves we use the following inverse demand and cost 
functions, 
 ln lnp a b h= +  (10) 
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 (1 )( , )
(1 )
NR
NR
x ch sc h
s K x
−=−  (11) 
Equation (10) is estimated from annual data, using real prices, over the period 1929-1986 from 
the Pacific halibut fishery which has one of the world’s longest continuous records of stock size 
and harvests. The inverse demand parameters, a and b, are estimated (standard errors in brackets) 
to be -2.6599 (0.4160) and –0.81 (0.1364). Equation (11) is of a form used in other fisheries 
(Grafton et al., 2000), but in the absence of adequate cost data cannot be estimated for the Pacific 
halibut fishery. Instead, we specify c = 0.17, and undertake sensitivity analysis to assess its effect 
on reserve size and the economic payoffs from a reserve.10  
Our biological parameters are also estimated from annual data for the Pacific halibut fishery 
over the period 1935-1983. The estimates (standard errors in brackets) are:  (0.0297) 
and million pounds (0.0238).
0.2985r =
0.9631K = 11 We also test for the presence of negative shocks using 
annual dummies over the 49 year period and find that the only significant negative shocks in the 
population occurred in 1964 and 1965 when it declined by some 13% in both years.12 In our 
simulations, we initially specify 0.05ρ =  and 1.0φ = , but undertake sensitivity analysis to 
determine their effects on reserve size and the economic payoffs from a reserve.  
 
(i) Resource Rents and the Probability and Size of Negative Shocks  
Identical positive and negative realisations in the reserve and harvested population are specified 
by  and . These realisations affect the variance of the population, 
harvest and resource rents, but play no direct role in our comparison of the economic payoffs 
from a marine reserve. However, if the stochastic process were to include negative drift it would 
alter the economic benefits associated with a reserve.  
( ) 0.05R Rg x x= ( ) 0.05NR NRg x x=
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The negative shocks are defined by the arrival rate, or probability of occurrence, and the size 
of the sensitivity of the shock in the reserve, ( )Rxψ , and harvested population, ( )Rxγ . We 
analyse the outcomes with equal shock sensitivities, i.e., ( ) 0.13R Rx xψ = −  and 
( ) 0.13NR NRx xγ = − , but also allow for the case of differential shock sensitivities, i.e., ( ) 0Rxψ =  
and ( ) 0.13NR NRx xγ = − . The case for different shocks comes from empirical evidence that finds 
some fishing methods damage habitat (Goñi, 1998; Turner et al., 1999; Jennings et al., 2001), and 
that fishing can have a deleterious impact on the age structure (Trippel, 1995; Palumbi, 2004) that 
can make the harvested population more vulnerable to environmental disturbances.   
Table 1 illustrates the economic payoffs of a reserve with optimal harvesting assuming a 13% 
negative shock in the harvested population and for different arrival rates, measured in years. The 
table shows that only if the negative shock occurs every 200 years does it not pay to have a 
marine reserve. For an arrival rate, or an incidence of a negative shock, more frequent than this a 
reserve generates an economic payoff to fishers by increasing resource rents. This shows that a 
reserve and output controls are not equivalent if a harvested population is subject to stochastic 
shocks. In other words, a reserve generates an extra economic payoff that cannot be obtained 
through harvest controls alone, even if they are applied optimally, as is the case in our model 
Table 1 also illustrates that the more frequent the occurrence of the negative shocks the larger 
will be the optimal reserve size.  A similar result is also found in terms of the magnitude or 
sensitivity of the negative shock on the harvested population. Table 2 shows the economic payoff 
from a reserve with negative shocks varying from 5% to 30% with an arrival rate of every 25 
years. Provided the shock is 5% or greater in the fishery, and given an arrival rate of every 25 
years, a reserve generates a economic payoff to fishers. By comparison, shocks in many fisheries 
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are much more substantial and occur more frequently than we suppose in our base case (Caddy 
and Gulland 1983; Hofmann and Powell, 1998).  
Table 2 illustrates that the larger the shock sensitivity, the greater the optimal reserve size and 
the greater payoff from a reserve of optimal reserve compared to no reserve. This result holds 
true even if the reserve and the fishery face the same shock sensitivities, as shown in Table 3. In 
other words our results do not depend on the assumption of a smaller negative shock in the 
reserve than in the harvested population. In the case of equal negative shocks to both the reserve 
and harvested populations, a marine reserve can still generate higher resource rents, but only 
when the magnitude of the shock is about 15% or greater, given an arrival rate of every 25 years.  
We can also show the benefits of a reserve in the case of positive shocks provided that the 
proportional impact on the reserve is equal to or greater than on the harvested population. 
However, in the absence of any negative shocks, or if the negative shocks are substantially 
greater in the reserve than in the harvested population, a reserve will not generate a positive 
economic payoff with optimal harvesting. 
The actual figures from the simulations presented in Tables 1-3 are not as important as what 
they imply about the economic payoffs from marine reserves. We show that under a wide range 
of scenarios in terms of arrival rates and shock magnitudes that a marine reserve can increase  
resource rents even with identical shock sensitivities in the reserve and harvested populations. 
Our result is important because it holds true despite the fact that in all the simulations harvesting 
is optimal, the population is persistent, and there exists no management error or uncertainty over 
the size of the current population. 
The intuition for our results is that reserves act as a ‘hedge’ in the presence of negative shocks 
that allow for a larger harvest immediately following a shock. Thus the greater the size of a 
negative shock, the more frequent is its occurrence, and the larger is its effect on the harvested 
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relative to the reserve population, the more valuable is a marine reserve and the bigger its optimal 
size. 
 
(ii) Resource Rents and Harvest Trade-offs 
We have shown that a reserve can generate an economic payoff to fishers, even with optimal 
harvesting, provided there exist negative shocks. These shocks reduce the return to fishers, but in 
the presence of such shocks a reserve provides a buffering effect that allows for a greater harvest 
after a shock, and thus higher resource rents than otherwise would be obtained. The tradeoff is 
that, in the absence of any shocks, a reserve reduces the harvest obtainable with optimal 
harvesting. The nature of the harvest tradeoffs is illustrated in Figure 1, assuming a negative 
shock in the fishery of 13% and an arrival rate of every 25 years that generate an optimal reserve 
size of 26%. For illustrative purposes in Figure 1 we set the shock frequency so that two –13% 
shocks occur, one after another, so as to simulate the –13% shock that actually occurred in both 
1964 and 1965 in the Pacific halibut fishery. Prior to the shocks in year 25 of our simulation the 
amount harvested is less with a reserve, but immediately after the shock and for some time 
afterwards, the reserve provides a greater harvest.  
The economic benefits of increased harvests immediately following a shock are subject to 
diminishing returns in terms of reserve size. This is shown in Tables 1-3 for any given negative 
shock and arrival rate. If there exists a positive optimal reserve size the payoffs first increase, 
reach a maximum at the optimum size, and then decline with further increases in reserve size.  In 
our simulations the initial population is of a given size, but we can show that the optimal reserve 
size (26%) in the base case is invariant to the population’s initial value.13 In other words, our 
results about the economic payoffs from a reserve relative to the no-reserve case are not 
dependent on the initial population being below its steady-state value. 
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 (iii) Biological and Economic Parameters 
The economic payoffs from marine reserves in the presence of negative shocks depend on the 
relative size of both biological and economic parameters. In terms of the biology, the intrinsic 
growth rate (r) and the transfer coefficient (φ ) are major determinants of the economic value of a 
reserve. We note that the higher the intrinsic growth rate, the quicker the population can rebound 
following a negative shock. Thus given that a reserve helps to increase the harvest immediately 
following a negative shock, we can show that the higher is the intrinsic growth rate the  smaller is 
the optimal reserve size. In our simulations, if we increase and decrease the estimated  r = 0.2985 
by one standard deviation ( 0.03σ = ), the optimal reserve size ranges from 24% (r  + σ ) to 28% 
(r - σ ). 
The transfer of fish from the reserve to the harvested population is also an important 
determinant of the economic payoffs from reserves. Namely, the greater the number of fish that 
leave the reserve and become subject to exploitation, the less protection that is provided by a 
reserve of a given size (Roberts and Sargant, 2002). Thus the greater is the rate of transfer from 
the reserve to exploited populations, the larger is the required reserve to provide a ‘hedge’ in the 
event of a negative shock. We can show that as we vary the transfer coefficient from 0.5 to 4.0 
the optimal reserve size increases from about 16% to a little over 50% of the total population 
given a –13% shock in the harvested population with an arrival rate of every 25 years.14  
Figure 2 shows the effects of different transfer coefficients on the harvest compared to the no-
reserve case assuming the same magnitude and frequency of negative shocks that were applied in 
Figure 1. Each transfer coefficient corresponds to a different optimal reserve size where the 
greater the transfer coefficient, the larger the optimal reserve size. Compared to the no-reserve 
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case, a larger transfer coefficient results in a lower harvest before the arrival of the negative 
shock, but generates a higher harvest immediately following the shock, and for some time 
thereafter. This illustrates the trade-off associated with increasing reserve size — more spillovers 
and a greater harvest following a negative shock, but a lower harvest in the absence of such a 
shock. 
In the terms of the resource rents, the lower is the discount rate, the greater the benefit from a 
reserve because the more valuable will be the future returns from a higher harvest immediately 
following a shock. Consequently, optimal reserve size and the economic payoff from a reserve 
are decreasing in the discount rate. This is illustrated in Figure 3 for an arrival rate of every 25 
years and a negative shock of 13% in the harvested population. Figure 3 also shows that, for the 
Pacific halibut fishery, the economic payoffs associated with a reserve are robust to changes in 
the discount rate. At a discount rate of about 20% the optimal reserve size is close to 20%, but 
even at a very high discount rate of 50% it still pays to have a marine reserve in the base-case, 
i.e., ( ) 0Rxψ = , ( ) 0.13NR NRx xγ = −  with an arrival rate of every 25 years.  
 
(iv) Economic Payoffs from Marine Reserves 
Our results provide a number of important insights when designing reserves for harvested 
populations subject to negative shocks. We find that reserves have a positive economic value 
under environmental uncertainty, even if harvesting is optimal in the sense that we maximise the 
discounted resource rents, and the size and the probability of occurrence of shocks are known in 
advance. This payoff arises via spillovers from the reserve to the harvested population that allow 
for a greater harvest immediately following a negative shock, and also reduce the recovery time 
of the harvested population. The speedier recovery of the population explains the result, found by 
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several authors, that marine reserves can lower harvesting variance and also population variance 
(Conrad, 1999). 
We emphasise that our results are obtained without assuming management uncertainty over 
stock size (Lauck et al., 1998), management errors in setting fishing effort, sub-optimal 
harvesting or a minimum viable population. We also show that reserves can generate economic 
payoffs without requiring a low population level or assuming that the current harvest lowers 
recruitment (Gerber et al. 2003, p. S58). Our simulations demonstrate that the larger the negative 
shock, the more frequent its occurrence, and the larger the proportional impact on the harvested 
relative to the reserve population, the greater the payoff from a reserve and the larger is its 
optimal size. These findings suggest that reserves can play an important role in raising fisher 
incomes in the presence of irreducible uncertainties (Ludwig et al., 1993).  
   
V Concluding Remarks 
 
Using a stochastic bioeconomic model that we develop and solve using a perturbation method, 
we show that a marine reserve can generate economic payoffs not previously identified in the 
literature. We find that even if harvesting is optimal, the population is persistent and there exists 
no uncertainty over the size of the current population, a marine reserve can increase resource 
rents and reduce the recovery time for a harvested population in the presence of negative shocks.  
The reason a reserve has economic value is because it allows for spillovers of fish from the 
reserve to the harvested population following a negative shock that can, in turn, raise resource 
rents. In this sense, reserves act a ‘hedge’ against negative shocks provided the sensitivity to the 
shock is not greater in the reserve than the harvested population. The tradeoff with a reserve, 
however, is lower harvests and resource rents in the absence of such shocks.  
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Using data from the Pacific halibut fishery, which has one of the world’s longest continuous 
records of stock size and harvests, we simulate the economic payoffs of a marine reserve with 
optimal harvesting under various scenarios regarding the size and incidence of negative shocks, 
and the relative impact on the reserve and harvested populations. We show that the larger the 
negative shocks, the more frequently they occur and the more they proportionally affect the 
harvested population, the larger will be the economic payoff from a marine reserve compared to 
no reserve, and the greater the optimal reserve size. We also find that spillovers from the reserve 
to the harvested population reduce the time it takes for the harvested population to recover 
following a shock that, in turn, can lower both the population and harvesting variance.  
Our results show that in the presence of stochastic shocks marine reserves can generate 
economic benefits even if the population is neither initially overexploited or subject to extinction, 
and there exists no management error over the level of fishing effort or management uncertainty 
regarding the current population. Overall, our findings provide new insights into the benefits of 
marine reserves that should prove useful to those managing renewable resources with uncertainty 
and designing reserves for fishery purposes.  
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Table 1: Value function for different arrival rates and reserve shares. 
 Reserve shares (% of total population) 
Arrival 
Rate 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
200 0.59270 0.59269 0.59257 0.59230 0.59181 0.59101 0.58966 0.58728 0.58255 0.56984 
40 0.59139 0.59152 0.59153 0.59138 0.59101 0.59032 0.58907 0.58680 0.58217 0.56955 
20 0.58974 0.59004 0.59022 0.59023 0.59001 0.58946 0.58834 0.58620 0.58168 0.56920 
15 0.58861 0.58904 0.58933 0.58945 0.58933 0.58887 0.58785 0.58579 0.58136 0.56896 
10 0.58640 0.58707 0.58759 0.58792 0.58800 0.58773 0.58688 0.58499 0.58072 0.56849 
Notes: 
1. Cells marked in bold correspond to reserve size that maximizes the value function for a given arrival rate. 
2. Shock magnitude or sensitivity is –13% for the harvested population and 0% for the reserve population. 
 
Table 2: Value function for different negative shocks sensitivities in the harvested population and 
a zero negative shock sensitivity in the reserve. 
 
Reserve share (% of total population) 
Shock 
Sensitivity in 
Harvested 
Population  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
-5% 0.59184 0.59191 0.59187 0.59168 0.59127 0.59054 0.58926 0.58695 0.58229 0.56964
-10% 0.59055 0.59077 0.59086 0.59079 0.59050 0.58987 0.58869 0.58648 0.58191 0.56937
-15% 0.58917 0.58954 0.58978 0.58985 0.58968 0.58917 0.58811 0.58600 0.58153 0.56908
-20% 0.58767 0.58823 0.58864 0.58886 0.58883 0.58845 0.58750 0.58550 0.58114 0.56880
-30% 0.58604 0.58681 0.58741 0.58781 0.58794 0.58770 0.58687 0.58499 0.58073 0.56850
Notes: 
1. Cells marked in bold correspond to a reserve size that maximizes the value function for a given shock 
sensitivity in the harvested population. 
2. Arrival rate of the negative shock is every 25 years. 
 
Table 3: Value function with identical negative shock sensitivities in reserve and harvested 
populations. 
 Reserve share (% of total population) 
Shock 
Sensitivity 
in Reserve 
& 
Harvested 
Populations 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
-5% 0.59226 0.59222 0.59207 0.59178 0.59127 0.59044 0.58907 0.58668 0.58195 0.56925 
-10% 0.59098 0.59097 0.59084 0.59055 0.59005 0.58923 0.58786 0.58548 0.58075 0.56809 
-15% 0.58961 0.58963 0.58953 0.58927 0.58878 0.58796 0.58660 0.58422 0.57949 0.56686 
-20% 0.58812 0.58821 0.58815 0.58792 0.58745 0.58664 0.58528 0.58289 0.57816 0.56555 
-25% 0.58652 0.58669 0.58670 0.58651 0.58606 0.58526 0.58389 0.58149 0.57675 0.56415 
-30% 0.58479 0.58507 0.58516 0.58502 0.58461 0.58382 0.58244 0.58002 0.57526 0.56267 
Notes: 
1. Cells marked in bold correspond to a reserve size that maximizes the value function for a given negative 
shock sensitivity. 
2. Arrival rate of the negative shock is every 25 years. 
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End Notes 
                                                 
1 The World Summit on Sustainable Development plan of implementation (article 32(c)) also requires “…the 
establishment of marine protected areas consistent with international law and based on scientific information, 
including representative networks by 2012…” (United Nations, 2002) 
2 The National Research Council (2001 pp. 111-118) discusses the proposals for a minimum 20% reserve in the 
coastal waters of the United States.  Using a bioeconomic model of the North Sea ecosystem Beattie et al. (2002) 
recommend a reserve size of between 25-40% of its surface area.  
3 We use Pimm’s (1984, p. 325) notion of resilience. He defines it as the speed at which a species composition 
returns to an equilibrium following a shock.  
4 Reviews of the literature include Guénette et al. (1998), National Research Council (2001), Ward et al. (2001) and 
Gell & Roberts (2002). 
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0s → 0Rx →5 We note that  such that as  then . 
6 Assuming a higher value of r and K in the reserve compared to the harvested population, i.e., rR > rNR  and KR > 
KNR, increases the economic payoffs from a reserve in our simulations. Thus our specification that r = rR = rNR  and K 
= KR = KNR understates the resource rent associated with reserves if fishing causes habitat destruction or undesirable 
changes to the age structure that negatively affect either the rate of growth or the carrying capacity of the population. 
7 The term (1- s) that multiplies the density difference in the two populations ensures that for a given difference, the 
absolute amount of fish transferred is decreasing in reserve size. This accounts for the fact that if a reserve were 
established that protected a very high percentage of the population, very few fish would be able to migrate to 
locations where they would actually be vulnerable to exploitation. Our results about the economic payoffs from 
reserves, however, are robust to alternative specifications of the transfer function. 
8 We note that recent work of marine reserve design suggests a diffusion mode of transfer is likely to understate the 
potential spillovers if marine reserves were designed to account for advection and flow generated connectivity across 
sites (Gaines et al. 2003, S45).  
9 The case for solving more realistic, but complicated models, by numerical methods in place of more simple models 
where analytic solutions and theorem proving are available, is made forcefully by Judd (1997; 1999). A general 
topological proof for the existence of an optimal solution (and a concave value function) in a system similar to (9), 
but without the jump process, is given in Atakan (2003).  
10 We vary c from 0.1 to 0.5 and in a base-case result (a negative shock in the harvested area of –13% that arrives 
about every 25 years) generate positive economic payoffs from a marine reserve for all values. We also find that 
optimal reserve size is increasing in the parameter c over this interval. 
11 Our estimates are very similar to those obtained by Hilborn and Walters (1992, p. 317) who use a different data 
coverage and estimate r = 0.31 and K = 1.0006 million pounds. 
12 The estimated parameters (standard errors in brackets) for the dummies in 1964 and 1965 are -0.1362 (0.0381) and  
-0.1247 (0.0428). 
13 In our simulations the steady-state population is invariant to the initial population. In other words, whether we 
rebuild or deplete the population, as we move towards the fluctuating steady state and if it pays to have a reserve of a 
fixed size, the optimal reserve size is identical in both cases. Figures that show this result are available upon request. 
14 A figure that shows the relationship between optimal reserve size and the transfer coefficient is available upon 
request. 
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Figure 1: The Difference in Harvest between the Case of Optimum Harvest with a
26% Reserve and Optimum Harvest with no Reserve
Transfer coefficient 0.5, Reserve size 16%
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Figure 2: Harvest Difference between Three Optimal Reserve Sizes and No Reserve
with Different Transfer Coefficients
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Figure 3: Relationship between Discount Rate and Optimum Reserve Size.
